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HEALTH CARE & PHARMACEUTICALS
Health Care Reform and the Logic of
Emergence
M. Gregg Bloche & Sujata M. Jhaveri*
Health policy wonks who get frustrated about the difficulty
of doing health care reform often resort to the parable of the
“boiled frog” to convey the dire consequences of failure. The
story of the “boiled frog” (with a few embellishments) goes
something like this:
 A frog hops into a pot of water—or an experimenter with
bad intentions puts him there.
 The experimenter (who does not think much of animal
rights activists) puts the pot on a stove and turns on the
gas.
 The water warms slowly. Because he is cold-blooded, the
frog’s body temperature rises to match the water’s.
 The frog does not notice that he—and the water—are
getting warmer. He stays in the pot—he could hop out
but he does not—until the water boils and he becomes
part of our dinner.
But there is a problem with the parable: researchers (with
bad attitudes!) have actually done this to frogs. German
physiologist Friedrich Goltz reported in 1869 that frogs
immersed in cool water become jumpy, then quite agitated as
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the water is warmed past room temperature.1 They, in fact, try
desperately to escape, and do so if there is not a lid on the pot.
Unless, that is, researchers (with worse attitudes!) first cut out
their brains; then the frogs blithely disregard their progress
toward the dinner table.
So the parable of the boiled frog sells frogs short. Only
brainless frogs do nothing, as we have done in health care
policy. It is fitting that some concerned about climate change
have also seized upon the frog parable, since our health care
system is fast becoming the fiscal equivalent of global warming.
Even as the number of people without medical coverage closes
in on fifty million, we are on track towards spending fifty
percent of our gross domestic product on medical care before
this century comes to an end.2 So says the Congressional
Budget Office, which points out the obvious: we are not really
going to spend fifty percent of our GDP on health care.3 The
consequences of doing so would be disastrous—for our fiscal
stability, economic standing in the world, and other personal
and national priorities. Something big will have to change.
Calls for “cost-control” or even cost reduction fail to convey
the challenge we face. Indeed, cost reductions of a one-time
nature are, over the long term, almost beside the point. Take,
for example, calls from political liberals for reductions in
administrative costs (often blamed on private insurers) and
calls from conservatives for reductions in costs arising from the
medical malpractice system. Proposals along these lines might
trim health spending by several or more percentage points,
their advocates say. But this is a one-time-only savings—cost
reduction that pales in comparison to the cumulative impact,
1. Friedrich Goltz, BEITRAGE ZUR LEHRE VON DEN FUNCTIONEN DER
NERVENCENTREN DES FROSCHES (1869). Michael Jones deserves credit for
bringing this pearl to public attention in an Atlantic Magazine blog post,
Michael Jones, Guest-post wisdom on frogs (July 21, 2009),
http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/07/guestpost_wisdom_on_frogs.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
2. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR
HEALTH CARE SPENDING 12 (2007). These CBO projections presume excess
cost growth rates (rates by which medical cost increases exceed GDP growth
for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending) that are well below
historical averages. Id. at 10–11. Were medical costs to continue to rise at
historical rates, health spending would soar to an unimaginable 100 percent of
GDP within seventy-five years. Id. at App. D.
3. See id. at 1. (“In reality, federal law will change in the future,
ensuring that the basis for the projections will not turn out to be correct.”).
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over a decade or more, of annual medical spending increases of
several percent or more.
What will need to change is well-captured by the
expression “Bending the Curve,” made popular among health
policy wonks by an eponymous Commonwealth Fund report on
cost-containment strategies, published in 2007.4 The challenge
before us is not cost reduction; it is reduction in the rate at
which health care spending is now rising. Health Care
spending has been growing for a half century or more at rates
several percentage points higher than inflation and GDP
growth. There is broad agreement, based on extensive evidence,
that this unsustainable rate of increase is not, in the main, due
to medical price inflation, aging boomers, or avaricious insurers
(rates of increase are not much higher in the U.S. than in
industrialized countries where private medical insurance plays
a lesser role5). Rather, this rate of increase is due to advances
in medical technology, powered by scientific discoveries and
availability of insurance (both public and private) to cover these
advances’ costs.
The challenge before us, if we are to “bend the curve,” is to
put the brakes on this process, gently—without denying tens of
millions of people access to a decent minimum of medical care
and without cutting back on care senselessly, absent regard for
comparative clinical benefit. Can the law of health care
provision empower us to achieve this?
Standard wisdom holds that health law is ill-situated to do
so. Health law, it is widely thought, is part of the problem.
American health law today is a chaotic and incomplete
patchwork created by fifty state court systems, twelve federal
circuits that act in disconnected fashion (only rarely overseen
by the U.S. Supreme Court), fifty state legislatures and sets of
regulatory agencies, and myriad other actors. In short, health
law verges on chaos—and often goes over the verge. Multiple
doctrines are at war with each other, core values are in sharp
conflict, and there is bitter disagreement over the basics of

4. CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, BENDING THE
CURVE: OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND IMPROVING VALUE IN U.S.
HEALTH
SPENDING
(2007),
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/EMBARGOED_FULL_REPORT_
Bending_the_Curve_optimized.pdf.
5. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD HEALTH DATA 2009.
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what reform of the American way of health care governance
should aim to accomplish.6 This disagreement has paralyzed
the politics of health reform.7
Commentary on health care law often acknowledges this
problem,8 yet rarely takes it seriously. Health law scholars are
wont to criticize the field’s incoherence, then to will this
incoherence away by urging one or another single, overarching
solution. In so doing, they presume the existence of a few key
decision-makers able to implement this solution by somehow
exercising top-down authority over the law in their domains.
Writers variously urge market-driven reform, more robust
regulation, and an expanded role for government as health care
payer. But putting any of these visions into effect would require
health law’s myriad deciders to step in rhythm to a single beat.
That, we contend, is the stuff of fantasy.
The central challenge for health law reformers, in our view,
is the impossibility of imposing any unifying, overarching
vision. Commentators who assume this challenge away
overlook health care law’s astonishing degree of fragmentation.
They ignore health law’s myriad, disconnected decision-makers,
competing stakeholders, and contradictory (but passionatelyfelt) moral commitments. Rather than treating this
fragmentation as something to be swept aside by some
overarching vision that we all should embrace, would-be health
law reformers should accept fragmentation, verging on chaos,
as inevitable. To this end, we will offer some ideas about how
aspiring reformers might try to navigate this fragmentation
and perhaps even turn health law’s contradictory impulses
toward reformist ends.
In most fields of law, the presumption of top-down decision
makers is a close-enough approximation to reality. The U.S.
6. See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT passim (1996).
7. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON’S HEALTH
SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS
8395, 133–63 (1996).
8. See Megan McArdle, The Healthcare Debate is a Kabuki Theatre of
Incoherence,
BUSINESS
INSIDER,
Nov.
23,
2009,
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-healthcare-debate-is-a-kabuki-theatre-ofincoherence-2009-11; see also John R. Graham, Another Incoherent HealthCare Poll in the New York Times, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, June 22, 2009,
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MTE5M2FlZTkyNGJiOTY5NTlmNT
kyMTQ0MjEzMzVlOTc.
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Supreme Court holds sway over constitutional law, and various
agencies set rules within their regulatory realms, subject to
judicial review and legislative oversight. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) are classic examples within their
respective fields of law. The law of health care provision in the
US does not function this way. No single authority sets the
rules or is in position to implement the proposals and
paradigms that commentators urge. Health law is the product
of many scattered deciders who act not in concert but in
interdependent fashion. These scattered deciders have
multiple, clashing understandings of what legal governance
should aim to accomplish. No single understanding can prevail.
Rather, health law exhibits the properties of an emergent
system—a system with a design that arises from ongoing
feedback among these deciders. Its design—its intelligence—
transcends these deciders. Indeed, it is a common feature of
emergent systems that their component elements do their part
absent awareness of their places in the larger scheme.
Ants, for example, “decide” to forage or to fight or to ferry
food from distant places based on pheromone levels they detect.
They neither take orders from their superiors nor grasp their
larger mission on the colony’s behalf. Our neurons do the same
thing, receiving signals then firing to activate or suppress
follow-on brain cells that participate in networks tied to
perceiving and understanding and acting upon the world.
Neurons, of course, have no sense of their larger networking
mission; they simply follow the laws of chemistry and physics.
The logic of our thoughts and behaviors emerges from this. The
designs of cities, societies, and economies likewise emerge from
the motives and actions of individuals who think they know
what they are doing but who are mostly unaware of their roles
in fashioning and sustaining neighborhoods, subcultures,
industries or the other social forms that organize our collective
lives.
We are, of course, different from ants and neurons. We are
more flexible, since our neural networks evolve in response to
events, and we are, at times, more self-aware. But what we
have in common with our remote six-legged relatives is that the
intelligence of our social forms transcends our sense, while in
the fray, of our motives and actions. The logic of American
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health law is similarly emergent, for better and often for worse.
Take for example, the tension between malpractice law’s
reliance upon professional standards of care and the
proposition that markets should permit consumers to pick from
among different levels of care, an idea that is embedded in
antitrust doctrine, and, to some degree, judicial interpretation
of health insurance contracts. Commentators on health law
typically treat this tension as a failure of coherence.9 Marketorientated commentators complain that liability for breach of
professional standards keeps health plans and providers from
offering lower-cost care and coverage options.10 On the other
hand, liberals, who object to tying medical care to ability to
pay, defend professional standards as a floor below which levels
of care should not fall.11
Viewing health law as an emergent system yields a
different understandingone that treats this apparent
incoherence as a channel for feedback among scattered deciders
with differing perspectives. A deeply felt commitment to health
equity and to the ideal of life’s pricelessness animates tort law’s
deference to professional standards of care. Were the law to
utterly abandon its reliance on professional standards, it would
detach itself from these concerns. This might undermine
people’s belief in law’s responsiveness to their hopes and fears.
Yet life, of course, is not priceless—the market price of life is
probably about $100,000 per quality-adjusted life year,12
resources are scarce, and Americans revere the market as the
most efficient and least authoritarian way to manage scarcity.
Antitrust and other doctrines that promote consumer choice in
health care express this. The legal regimes that govern medical
malpractice and restraints on competition therefore embody
competing ideals to which Americans are inextricably
9. See, e.g., Anne Zieger, Antitrust Laws Could Hobble Healthcare
HEALTHCARE,
May
27,
2009,
Reform,
FIERCE
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/antitrust-laws-could-hobble-healthcarereform/2009-05-27.
10. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE
CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 146 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health
Care is Medically Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229 passim (1999)
(urging reliance on professional standards to determine levels of care and
health insurance coverage).
12. David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, The Value of Health: 1970–
1990, AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 1998, at 97.
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committed.
From an emergent systems perspective, this is not a
contradiction. It is an opportunity for mutual feedback among
component systems that constitute health law. Antitrust
lawyers who take a combative stance toward professional
standards can stay true to their conviction, as can egalitarians
that see health care allocation based on ability to pay as
anathema. Both sides think they know what they are doing—
campaigning to make health law more consistent and to get it
right by cleansing it of the pernicious influence of the opposing
view. Both sides, meanwhile, participate in a larger process of
which they may be only dimly aware, a process of feedback
between legal schemes that sometimes sustains existing
arrangements and that at other times pushes health care
governance hard in one direction or another as scattered
deciders take account of developments in neighboring suites of
law.
Myriad other feedback schemes shape the regulatory
governance of health care. Some of these schemes involve
classic tensions in American public life—between national and
local governance (the struggle over ERISA pre-emption of state
efforts to expand coverage13 is a case in point), equity and
autonomy (the debate over the extent to which informed
consent law should accommodate individuals’ varied
preferences14 is illustrative), and public versus personal
responsibility for finding shelter against life’s vicissitudes (this
is the central theme of recurring battles over the scope of
health insurance initiatives for the disadvantaged).
Such feedback schemes enable the expression of values and
concerns that are at odds with each other but deeply felt, to the
point that health law cannot realistically discard them. Legal
and regulatory actions that offend these values inspire
responsesfrom the losing parties and from legal decision
makers with different perspectives. Decision-makers charged
with implementing different legal regimestort and contract,
ERISA, antitrust, and many otherssend negative or positive
feedback signals through their responses.

13. See, e.g., Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of S.F., 512 F.3d
1112 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, (No. 08-1515) (July 10, 2009).
14. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48–
84 (1984).
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For instance, refusal by state judges to endorse contractual
departures from professional standards of care in medical
malpractice cases sends a dampening message to antitrust and
other decision makers who are eager to advance the market
model in the medical realm. Conversely, state courts’ growing
willingness since the 1970s to permit insurers to deny coverage
for physician-prescribed services on contract law grounds
signals that their support for professional authority has
diminished. The Supreme Court’s refusal to give full effect to
the market model, even in the antitrust context (for example,
the Justices’ acceptance of professional restrictions on price
advertising15) may reflect its summing of these and other mixed
signals, from many decision makers, about the comparative
desirability of untrammeled competition and deference to
professional norms.
Consider Justice Souter’s mixed messages about the sweep
of markets in the medical realm. In the year 2000, in Pegram v.
Herdrich, he characterized clinical standards of care as the
product of market-driven cost benefit trade-offs beyond the
scope of regulatory oversight under ERISA.16 But just two
years later, in Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, he portrayed
medical standards of care as a matter of professional opinion,
not contract.17 For some, this inconsistency merits scorn. It is
poor judicial craftsmanship, pure and simple, or so it seems.
But it is also a sign of the Court’s role as a processor of mixed
messages about the role of markets and professionalism in
health care governance.
The Justices participate in overlapping networks of
feedback involving health law’s myriad decision makers. In
response to the varied signals the Justices receive, they rely
upon competing models of medical governance, all of which
have some legal force. So it is hardly surprising that the Court
sends messages that don’t cohere. Consistency would require
the Justices to discard large parts of health law, embodying
values and concerns Americans are unwilling to abandon.
Within the networks of decision-making that constitute health
care law, negative feedback tends to support the status quo,

15. California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 759
(1999).
16. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–32 (2000).
17. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386 (2002).

BLOCHE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

HEALTH CARE REFORM

3/9/2010 11:07 AM

201

and positive feedback tends to promote change. Novel judicial,
regulatory, and legislative gambits typically provoke
suppressive responses, but they sometimes catch fire,
propagating to broader networks of decision-makers.
The law’s embrace of the market paradigm is the highest
profile case of this phenomenon. Isolated market-oriented
initiatives in the 1970s—the Supreme Court’s abandonment of
the “learned professions” exemption from antitrust law18 and
Congressional passage of a law promoting HMOs19—triggered
positive responses, probably boosted by rising skepticism
toward professional authority. Other decision-makers picked
up, then amplified the signal. The Federal Trade Commission
began antitrust enforcement against health care providers,20
state regulators backed away from “Certificate of Need”
limitations on hospitals’ capital investment,21 and courts, as
mentioned earlier, began allowing insurers to decline coverage
for physician-prescribed care.22
Preceding and parallel developments in “neighboring”
doctrinal spaces widened the possibilities for propagation. Most
of those who urged more robust informed consent requirements
during the 1960s and 1970s didn’t mean to promote medical
markets. But they did just that, by winning broader legal and
cultural recognition for patient autonomy.23 This in turn
primed courts’, regulators’, and the public’s receptivity to the
competition paradigm.24 Likewise, for the Congress that
enacted ERISA in 197425—in response to pension fund scandals
18. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e (1982).
20. Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services
Industry: What Does It All Mean?, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166, 167–
68 (1980); see, e.g., In re Medical Staff of Memorial Medical Ctr. 110 F.T.C. 541
(1988); In re Preferred Physicians, Inc. 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988); In re Hospital
Corp. of America 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985).
21. See Frank A. Sloan, Government and the Regulation of Hospital Care,
AM. ECON. REV. 196, 198 (1982); Christopher J. Conover & Frank A. Sloan,
Does Removing Certificate-of-Need Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care
Spending?, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 455 (1998) (reviewing the effect of
historical changes in certificate of need laws).
22. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).
23. See e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 139–40 (1986).
24. See e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, The “Competition Revolution” in Health Care,
7 HEALTH AFF. 5 (1988).
25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L.
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that shattered American workers’ confidence—the implications
for health insurance were an afterthought.26 But by preempting most state regulation of employee benefit plans (and
substituting few minimum requirements of its own); ERISA
largely deregulated the market for medical coverage.
Out of many interwoven networks of deciders, health care
law emerges. This self-organizing process hardly guarantees a
governance system that serves us well. By way of analogy,
emergence in biological systems generates tumors, seizures and
other phenomena that careen out of control when the feedback
mechanisms that maintain homeostasis fail. America’s
worsening crises of cost and access,27 clinical mistakes that kill
tens of thousands of patients a year,28 and the proliferation of
treatments absent proof of their value29 strongly suggest that
in health care law much has gone awry. How to intervene to
make health law part of the solution—or, at the least, to keep
law from making the problems worse—is a question that calls
for attention to the dynamics of emergence.
How might focus on the dynamics of emergence guide
reformers’ efforts to reshape, or at least nudge, the law of
health care provision? We want to suggest a few possibilities on
No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C. (2006)).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2007).
27. Todd P. Gilmer & Richard G. Kronick, Hard Times and Health
Insurance: How Many Americans Will Be Uninsured by 2010? (web exclusive),
28 HEALTH AFF. w573–w574 (2009).
28. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (executive summary) (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M.
Corrigan,
& Molla
S.
Donaldson,
eds.)
(1999), available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/to_err_is_human/reportbrief.pdf; see also Drew E.
Altman et al., Improving Patient Safety—Five Years After the IOM Report, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2041 (2004). But see Troyen A. Brennan et al., Accidental
Deaths, Saved Lives, and Improved Quality, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405
(2005) (suggesting that while the 1999 IOM report shed light on a major
concern within American health care, it focuses too strongly on the concept of
preventable individual accidental deaths rather than use of evidence-based
medicine to improve quality of care).
29. See, e.g., ELLIOT FISHER ET AL., HEALTH CARE SPENDING, QUALITY,
AND
OUTCOMES:
MORE
ISN’T
ALWAYS
BETTER
available
at
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/Spending_Brief_022709.pdf (discussing
overuse of clinical interventions without evidence of their efficacy); JOHN E.
WENNBERG ET AL., THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 222 (1999), available at
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/99Atlas.pdf (discussing overuse use of
treatments absent scientific proof of benefits and harms).

BLOCHE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

HEALTH CARE REFORM

3/9/2010 11:07 AM

203

the access-to-care front. Most Americans say they support
universal coverage. But political and legal obstacles that are
manageable through emergence-oriented reform strategies
have repeatedly stymied attempts to achieve it. A large barrier
is ERISA preemption of state initiatives.30 Many of these state
initiatives require employers to either cover their workers or
pay into public funds to subsidize insurance; this raises the
issue of whether ERISA preempts such state laws.31 Less
tangible obstacles include ideological resistance to publicly
supported
coverage
as
incompatible
with
personal
responsibility and the risk-aversion of health care stakeholders,
who often oppose change that could disrupt cash flows upon
which they have come to rely.
Clearing the ERISA barrier to state-level reform efforts
would open up a variety of potential evolutionary pathways
toward nationwide universal coverage. States have seized the
initiative on the health reform front with creative, bipartisan
ideas about how to expand coverage.32 From a conventional
health reform perspective, the prospect of 50 different state
systems is anathema. A single national system, whether
market-oriented or government-administered, would seem
essential to avoid Byzantine bureaucratic and legal complexity.
However, from a pragmatic perspective, perhaps incremental
reform via state models should be promoted. Ideological and
interest-group gridlock at the federal level makes national
reform difficult, as recent reform battles have reminded us.33
State-by-state progress, meanwhile, could build momentum
toward nationwide insistence on universal coverage, so long as
high-visibility state initiatives are seen as successful and, thus,
worth propagating.

30. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
31. Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and
Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203 (2007).
32. See generally Joel C. Cantor et al., Challenges of State Health Reform:
Variations in Ten States, 17 HEALTH AFF. 191 (1998); Richard P. Nathan,
Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005); see also, John E.
McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access
Reform (web exclusive), 25 HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006) (detailing how the most
well-known state health reform initiative is constructed).
33. Dan Eggen, Health-care Lobbyists Continue Spending Spree, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
BLOG
(Oct.
21,
2009,
5:00
AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/health-care-reform/2009/10/healthcare_lobbyists_continue.html.
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Similarities in design are likely to result from the
propagation of successful state models along informal networks
of influence. These similarities would ease administrative
burdens. But if large employers or health plans become
sufficiently concerned about the Balkanization of legal and
regulatory requirements, they could press Congress and the
White House for federalization of the emerging universal
coverage system. They might well succeed, demonstrating the
power of feedback mechanisms to transform health policy and
law in circuitous fashion—and locking in a national
commitment to medical coverage for all. Support for state
initiatives is thus a wise gamble from an emergent systems
perspective, even if one aspires, ultimately, to a federal regime
of universal coverage.
There is, of course, no guarantee that state-driven reform
would lead to any particular model for expanding coverage. But
more likely than not, one or a few prevailing models would
emerge as the states’ experiences influence each other. Nor
must state-level reform lead, in the end, to state governance of
health insurance coverage. Congress and the White House
could respond to state initiatives by imposing an overarching
federal scheme. Were this to happen, state reforms would still
have served a vital purpose by nudging the country toward
universal coverage.
This rationale favors legislative revision of ERISA to clear
the way for state experimentation—and, in the meanwhile,
judicial construction of ERISA to minimize preemption of state
initiatives.34 There’s ample doctrinal space for such a judicial
reading. The Supreme Court has said, in a case involving state
regulation of hospital charges, ERISA’s pre-emptive provisions
are to be read narrowly when they infringe traditional state
power over health matters.35 Some lower court precedent poses
a threat to state-level “pay or play” requirements,36 but the
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2007).
35. See N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659–62 (1995) (holding that state law requiring
hospitals to collect higher payments from commercial insurers than from
nonprofit Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans survives §514 preemption).
36. See e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th
Cir. 2007) (holding that legislation by the Maryland General Assembly which
called for employees to spend a certain percentage of their total payroll on
health insurance costs or pay the amount to the state was preempted by
ERISA). But see Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of S.F., 512 F.3d
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accretion of state reform initiatives would put pressure on
judges not to stymie legislators when neither Supreme Court
precedent nor the plain language of ERISA requires it.
Objections to publicly supported coverage on the ground
that it is incompatible with personal responsibility pose a
larger challenge. Denunciations of universal coverage as
“socialism” or the like may be overwrought, but they’ve gained
populist traction because of many Americans’ worries about
subverting self-reliance.37 Commentators, advocacy groups,
public officials, and others who favor government action to
increase access have offered lots of counterarguments. This
debate has been joined in American politics since Theodore
Roosevelt urged national health insurance during his Bull
Moose run for the presidency in 1912.38 There have been
incremental steps forward—Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,
Medicaid expansion during the ‘80’s, and SCHIP in 1997. Yet
portrayals of public coverage as a handout and a step towards
socialism have maintained their resonance.
Universal coverage proponents have struggled to rebut this
portrayal. But the logic of emergence suggests another
approach, one that takes advantage of the tension between
people’s commitments to universal coverage and self-reliance.
Rather than ruing this tension, health policy progressives
should harness its political energy by weaving individual
responsibility and mutual obligation together into a new
reciprocity of personal and public commitment to health.39
This new reciprocity might start with an enhanced sense of
individual obligation—to eat sensibly, exercise regularly, avoid
smoking and otherwise care for ourselves. It ought to include
an obligation to buy health insurance. Our failure to do these

1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a similar law survives ERISA preemption).
37. See, e.g., Editorial, Misinformation, Mayhem Mar Debate on Health
TODAY
BLOG,
(Aug.
10,
2009,
12:21
AM),
Care,
USA
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/08/our-opinion-misinformation-mayhemmar-debate-on-health-care.html; Sam Stein, Steele Calls Obama Health Care
Socialism, Agrees This His Waterloo, HUFFINGTON POST, July 9, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/20/steele-calls-obamahealth_n_240989.html.
38. Kaiser Family Foundation, National Health Insurance—A Brief
History of Reform Efforts in the U.S. (Focus on Health Reform series) (March
2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf.
39. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care for All?, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173–75
(2007).
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things ought to carry consequences, like premium surcharges
and a measure of embarrassment over personal behavior that
adds health risk without corresponding social benefit. The
state, in exchange, should offer some protection when selfreliance falters. Americans who cannot afford coverage ought to
be able to turn to their government for help in acquiring it. If
the US is to come close to universal coverage, personal
responsibility will probably need to play a larger role than it
did in the mid-20th century welfare state.
The risk-aversion of health care stakeholders is perhaps
the least-appreciated obstacle to coverage expansion. Health
care reform disrupts existing subsidies and revenue streams by
replacing them with promised alternatives. Risk-averse
stakeholders often oppose reform proposals even when the
resulting disruptions are likely to yield net benefits by
replacing current funding streams with larger subsidies and
revenues. Foremost among the disruptions likely to ensue from
coverage expansion (and its public financing) is the shift from
veiled cross-subsidies to visible means of financing care for the
less well off.40 Americans subsidize care for the medically
indigent through a variety of mechanisms that few understand.
These include extra payments from the Medicare Trust Fund to
hospitals with large numbers of uninsured patients, as well as
private insurance premiums set high enough to contribute to
the cost of indigent care.41 Publicly sponsored coverage for the
less well off would supplant these cross-subsidies with a highprofile tax, an inviting political target. The prospect of these
cross-subsidies’ disappearance or diminution alarms hospitals
and clinics who fear that public funding for broader coverage
won’t suffice to replace this bird in hand.
Stakeholders’ concerns about the disruption of their
revenue streams as the result of movement toward universal
coverage are a large obstacle to reform. In California, these
concerns proved fatal to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s

40. See H.R.3962, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009). The
House Democrats’ bill, unveiled on November 18, 2009, would impose a 40
percent tax on so-called “Cadillac plans,” which have insurance premiums
above $8,500 for an individual and $23,000 for a family. Those thresholds
represent the total paid by both employer and employee.
41. See generally Gail R. Wilensky, Solving Uncompensated Hospital
Care: Targeting the Indigent and the Uninsured, 3 HEALTH AFF. 50 (1984).
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2007 reform plan.42 And these concerns need to be taken
seriously. From a conventional policy wonk perspective, this
disruption shouldn’t count. It is just a transition problem. If
one or more universal coverage proposals represent an
improvement over today’s tangled web of inefficient crosssubsidies, it ought to be enacted, policy wonks and law
professors like to say, unless a competing scheme would
improve things even further.
But from an emergent systems perspective, transitions are
crucial periods, not merely details to be worked out
bureaucratically and legally after new policies are chosen.
Rather, transitions are the terrain that must be crossed to
achieve policy ends. Obstacles have to be anticipated—
obstacles created by stakeholders, cumbersome bureaucratic
structures, and extant legal regimes. Further, public
perceptions are crucial, as is illustrated by voters’ resistance to
new taxes even when these would supplant payroll deductions
that cross-subsidize care for the poor.
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson
understood this last point when they insisted on characterizing
working Americans’ contributions towards Social Security and
Medicare as insurance premiums, not taxes. Aspiring architects
of expanded medical coverage today would do well to fashion
schemes that separate collection of general tax revenues from
public financing of care for people unable to meet their own
medical needs. This is more than just rhetoric; both promising
political pathways and insurmountable obstacles to reform
emerge from the structure of people’s perceptions about the
options they confront. More generally, aspiring architects of
reform should avoid large, immediate disruption of current
financial arrangements, even when the policy case for
disruption is powerful. Sudden disruption of settled
expectations invites fierce political and legal resistance from
42. Governor of the State of California, Governor’s Health Care Proposal 7
(Jan.
8,
2007),
available
at
http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf. California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed to pay for expanded medical coverage in part
by pooling current cross-subsidy streams and rechanneling them from
hospitals and clinics to support insurance premiums for the less well-off.
Health care providers, who receive these cross-subsidies, have fretted about
the prospect that they could lose these cross-subsidies and still face a
substantial uncompensated care burden, absent the achievement of universal
coverage.
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stakeholders—resistance that puts reform at risk.
From an emergent systems perspective, getting reform
right is more than a matter of preparing the blueprint for the
best policy in the abstract. It requires charting a path through
networks of political and legal influence. Policies that postpone
the prospect of disruption—leaving open multiple, more
gradual evolutionary possibilities—will tend to arouse less
resistance.
There is, for example, a strong public policy case for ending
tax exemption of not-for-profit hospitals upon the advent of
universal, comprehensive coverage.43 The prevailing rationale
for property and income tax exemption of hospitals has long
been that they provide for people unable to pay. Universal
coverage would render this rationale obsolete. Elimination of
these tax subsidies would make additional state and federal
dollars available to support insurance for those unable to afford
it. Redirecting public funds from subsidies for hospitals to
coverage for the uninsured would both empower patients and
better match public spending with clinical need. This all makes
sense, at least to us;44 yet the not-for-profit hospital sector’s
resistance to its loss of tax exemption weighs heavily against
trying to do so as part of health reform. Exemption, even for
hospitals that provide minimal charity care, has become a
settled expectation. The industry is reluctant to give up this
bird-in-hand. Enactment of universal coverage at either the
state or federal level without the non-profit hospital sector’s
support is difficult to imagine, so the demise of this otherwise
unjustifiable subsidy isn’t worth demanding. The landscape of
health care financing is crisscrossed with subsidy schemes like
this one—hard to justify on policy grounds but built into settled
expectations to the point that their elimination isn’t worth the
political cost.
Since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, opponents
of publicly sponsored universal coverage have displayed a
deeper intuitive awareness of the dynamics of emergence than
have advocates of health insurance for all. A stunning example
43. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and
the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299 passim (1995).
44. But see Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The
Behavior, Law and Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345,
1408 (2003) (arguing that nonprofit hospitals supply social benefits that merit
the tax exemption).
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played out in 1993 as congressional Republicans scrambled to
prepare for President Clinton’s anticipated health care reform
juggernaut. Republican Senate and House leaders eyed
plausible compromises that might have achieved nearuniversal coverage with a reduced role for government. These
compromises hewed to traditional Republican principles. They
would have left open a wide playing field for competition
between health plans, minimally restricted by federal
regulators.
But conservative strategist William Kristol looked beyond
the policy logic of the possible deals, toward the longer-term
implications of government-guaranteed coverage.45 For
Republicans, he intuited, the implications of universal coverage
were disastrous.46 Enactment of any publicly financed scheme
to cover all would rekindle Roosevelt-era confidence in
government as guarantor of personal security, undermining the
broader Republican case for lower taxes and less government.47
Conversely, utter defeat for health care reform on President
Clinton’s watch would deliver a lasting blow to Americans’
belief in government’s ability to solve complex social
problems—and to confidence in Democrats’ ability to deliver on
their promises.48
In a memo that quickly achieved iconic status among
conservatives, Kristol urged Republicans to go all-out to kill
health care reform.49 “There should be no deals, no carefully
nuanced compromises,” Kristol argued. “The Clinton plan
should come to nothing except disillusionment.”50 Swayed by
Kristol’s analysis, House and Senate Republican leaders
abandoned compromise alternatives in favor of a scorched-

45. Adam Meyerson, Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of
the GOP, POL’Y REV, Winter 1994, at 14, 15; Thomas B. Edsall, Happy Hours,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A27. In an influential memo, Mr. Kristol wrote:
“Any Republican urge to negotiate a ‘least bad’ compromise with the
Democrats, and thereby gain momentary public credit for helping the
president ‘do something’ about health care, should also be resisted. The plan
should not be amended; it should be erased.” Id.
46. Meyerson, supra note 45, at x.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan,
HEALTH AFFIARS, Spring 1995, at 66, 75–76.
50. Id.; Meyerson, supra note 45, at x.
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earth stance toward health care reform.51 By the fall of 1994,
the Clinton plan had succumbed. Just a few months later,
disillusioned voters delivered both houses of Congress to
Republicans for the first time in forty years.52 Universal
coverage disappeared from the national agenda for a decade,
during which time the ranks of the uninsured grew by about a
million a year. And more than that, Americans maintained
their skepticism toward government’s ability to transform their
lives for the better through grand social policy schemes. Kristol
had gotten it right.
Until, that is, 2009. Suddenly, out of sheer terror, as
Barack Obama took the presidential oath in January,
Americans looked to government with large expectations.
Suddenly, as economic catastrophe loomed, Americans saw
regulation as an urgent need. During the early months of 2009,
pundits suggested that the cost of financial rescue would
preclude comprehensive health reform, including universal
coverage. But the opposite turned out to be the case. “Tea
parties” & “town-hall” shoutfests aside, government’s sudden,
large involvement in finance—with seemingly successful
results (we’ve avoided a 2nd Great Depression)53—elevated
Americans’ sense of what the state should attempt, in health
care and other spheres.
The reform bills that wended their way through the House
and Senate in 2009—and the reform principles promoted by
President Obama—displayed an acute sensitivity to the
dynamics of emergence.54 Their organizing principle was the
importance of minimizing disruption of established
arrangements and settled expectations. To this end, these
proposals left employment-based coverage in place. They
pursued universal coverage by expanding Medicaid to reach
lower-income Americans not now eligible for these programs
51. Manish C. Shah & Judith M.Rosenberg, Health Care Reform in the
103D CongressA Congressional Analysis, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 585, 609
(1996).
52. Skocpol, supra note 49, at 67.
53. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: ADVANCING
ECONOMIC STABILITY THROUGH TRANSPARENCY, COORDINATED OVERSIGHT
AND ROBUST ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009).
54. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th
Congress (as passed by House, November 7, 2009); America’s Healthy Future
Act of 2009, S. 1796 111th Congress (2009).
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and by subsidizing middle-income Americans’ purchase of
private insurance. They avoided extending Medicaid and The
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to people
at income levels within the marketing sights of private
insurers. And the subsidies these bills promised for the
purchase of private coverage offered a multibillion dollar
benefit for insurers. The only likely, near-term “losers” were
employers who do not now provide coverage: most of these
proposals required employers to choose between offering
insurance and paying a tax (or “fee”) to support the public
subsidies.55
These reform plans aimed to build momentum for coverage
expansion by leveraging some existing arrangements and
minimizing disruption to others. On the other hand, they
opened pathways toward long-term, fundamental change.
By establishing insurance exchanges to pool risk (and
thereby reduce premiums) for individual insurance purchasers
and small employer groups, they created an economically viable
alternative to workplace-based coverage. Over time, this
alternative purchasing mechanism could eclipse the workplace
as America’s main source for private insurance. The ability of
insurance exchanges to attract large numbers of purchasers
and to offer many coverage choices would give them formidable
advantages over employment-based plans. Vast purchasing
pools could turn these exchanges into the “Amazon.coms” of
medical coverage, able to out-perform all but the largest
employers on price.
Things could play out this way, but, then again, they may
not. The bills that advanced through Congress in 2009 leave
this question open. They treat the future of employment-based
coverage as a thing to be decided in emergent fashion. Its
persistence, or demise, will be determined by millions of
Americans, acting as best they can to protect their families and
themselves, with minimal attention to the policy impact of their
choices.
A more provocative possibility is the emergence of “single
payer” coverage from these plans. This prospect mobilized the
insurance
industry—and
some
other
health
care

55. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th
Congress § 412 (as passed by House, November 7, 2009), America’s Healthy
Future Act of 2009, S. 1796 111th Congress § 1306–1307 (2009).
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stakeholders—to oppose the so-called “public option” with a
vengeance. If a public plan were to fare better than its rivals in
the competition for subscriberswhether because of lower
administrative costs, better deals with doctors and hospitals, or
other reasons—it could eventually come to overshadow them.
This growth could feed back upon itself in positive fashion, by
empowering the plan to obtain lower prices from providers,
thereby
crowding
out
private
competitors.
Absent
Congressional intervention to limit the public plan’s
monopsony power over providers or to otherwise restrain its
growth, it could evolve into “single payer” coverage. This longrun outcome—ideal in the eyes of some and nightmarish to
others—is hardly foreordained. American antipathy toward
government bureaucrats and one-size-fits-all solutions could
limit the public plan’s appeal.
Unfortunately, the reform proposals that made their way
through Congress in 2009 offered much less to address the
long-term growth of medical spending. To be sure, reforms that
target administrative costs, the medical tort system, and the
myriad inefficiencies in health care delivery have considerable
potential to achieve cost reductions. Such reductions “ratchet
down” the medical cost curve. But they do little to diminish its
long-term, upward slope. If we are to “bend the curve”
downward—that is, if we’re to substantially reduce the rate of
health care cost growth in the decades ahead—we will need to
break free from—or finesse—a political constraint that has so
far prevented real progress toward long-term cost-containment.
The constraint is this: weighing clinical benefits against
costs and saying no to care that prolongs lives at too great an
expense is essential, if we’re to control costs, yet unspeakable in
politics and in the marketplace. The “R-word”—rationing—
remains taboo. Policy proposals that even suggest the setting of
limits, or lay the foundations for it, arouse public ire. The
“death panels” kerfuffle during the summer of 2009
underscored this issue’s explosive potential, as did Rush
Limbaugh’s claim earlier in the year that the economic
stimulus bill passed by Congress in February created a
“national health care rationing board.”56
56. Lori Robertson, Doctor’s Orders?, FactCheck.org, Feb. 20, 2009,
http://www.factcheck.org/2009/02/doctors-orders/ (“Radio host Rush Limbaugh
repeated such charges on Feb. 10, telling his listeners that ‘if the cost of your
treatment as a seasoned citizen is deemed by the government to be too
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Political liberals have shown equal willingness to score
points with the “R-word.” They have done so in response to
Republican proposals to transform the Medicare entitlement
into a fixed-value voucher for the purchase of private health
insurance—and in response to proposals to end or cap the tax
deductibility of employees’ and employers’ contributions toward
health insurance premiums. Industry stakeholders (doctors,
drug companies, and others) who stand to lose from limits on
medical cost growth have taken similar advantage of this taboo.
They’ve attacked limit-setting by both private and public
payers as “rationing,” and this has gained them political
traction.
So long as society rejects the setting of limits, neither law
nor markets can impose it. But changes in law and policy have
some potential to nudge us toward greater willingness to weigh
costs and benefits at the bedside. A robust program of
comparative effectiveness research, greater price transparency,
and the tying of insurance co-payment requirements to the
clinical value of tests and treatments hold promise in this
regard. These strategies are emergent in their orientation: they
aim to open pathways toward cultural change that would make
clinical limit-setting more acceptable.
Creative steps are also possible in the meanwhile, before
Americans are culturally ready to say “no” to potentially
beneficial care on account of cost. Emergent systems thinking
suggests an evolutionary strategy, anchored in people’s
different expectations about pricey treatments that are
available now and that might arise as medicine advances. Most
Americans bristle at being denied today’s state-of-the-art care
on account of cost. But they are not angry at doctors or health
plans for failing to provide access to the nanotechnologies and
micro-electronics of, say, the mid-21st century. They are not
upset because they don’t get the care “Dr. McCoy” delivers
during cable TV reruns of “Star Trek.” There’s a cost-control
opportunity here that doesn’t depend on wide-spread
willingness to ration care. If we rein in the development of
ever-more-expensive technology that yields small marginal
benefits, we can bend the health care cost curve downward
without saying “no” to identified patients.

expensive based on how much longer you have to live, then you don’t get
treated.’”).
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We can do so by shrinking the huge premiums we pay
doctors and hospitals’ for doing invasive, technology-intensive
procedures, compared to what we pay them for counseling
patients or delivering biologically-powerful but minimallyinvasive treatments. This won’t save much money now, since
doctors’ fees are only a small fraction of health spending. But it
will diminish doctors’ and hospitals’ incentives to adopt the
clinical interventions that are the main drivers of medical
costs—ever more sophisticated technologies that achieve only
small clinical benefits.
A concern here is the risk of discouraging real
breakthroughs—advances that yield high value, relative to
cost. But major breakthroughs tend to result from leaps in
biological understanding of disease—advances that open the
way for elegant, decisive interventions. Penicillin, which
destroys bacterial cell walls, is the classic example. A more
recent case is the revolution in our understanding of lipid
metabolism, which opened the way for development of the
statins, drugs taken by millions of Americans to slow the
growth of artery-clogging plaque. Therapies that target
pathophysiology in such elegant fashion tend to be relatively
cheap, once the basic science that undergirds them has been
paid for. By contrast, our most costly treatments—those that
Lewis Thomas famously termed “half way technologies”57 —
tend to rest on comparatively crude understandings of the
biology of disease. They are, paradoxically marvels of
engineering, electronics, and materials science, and of modest,
often minimal medical benefit. Examples include drug-coated
stents designed to keep atherosclerotic arteries open, hightechnology life support, and last-ditch radiation and
chemotherapy regimens meant mainly to sustain hope.
Such treatments account for much of the medical spending
that occurs in the last months of life. They are expensive
because they are both technology-intensive and clinically
indecisive. Their inability, in most cases, to make more than a
modest therapeutic difference leads, perversely, to their
intensive and sustained (rather than one-shot) use. In
medicine, as in warfare, decisive victory is cheaper than a
drawn-out struggle.
Reducing the rewards available to doctors and hospitals for
57. LEWIS THOMAS, LIVES OF A CELL 31–37 (1975).
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adoption of “half-way” technologies will, in turn, diminish
investment in efforts to develop them. Venture capitalists and
investment bankers will be less likely to take a chance on them.
Firms will adjust their research and development budgets
accordingly. Unidentified future patients would forgo some
therapeutic benefits. But popular ire over denial of beneficial
care wouldn’t come into play, since the treatments “withheld”
don’t exist. This strategy is emergence-oriented in two ways.
First, it exploits openings for relatively modest changes in
current law. It seeks out, and aims to exploit, non-linear
relationships between legal change and real-world impact.
Second, it anticipates actors’ adjustments to changed
incentives—and to other actors’ adaptations.
The emergent systems perspective makes sense of the
seeming chaos that besets American health law and policy. It
cautions us that no single “grand theory” of health care
governance will or can triumph over others. It empowers health
reformers to develop pragmatic agendas for change by looking
for evolutionary possibilities immanent in current law,
institutions, politics, and culture. Health law’s fragmentation
and incoherence are large obstacles to urgently-needed change.
But they reflect the ongoing collision of values and interests
that shape the health sphere’s legal governance. Whether we
can avert health care’s threat to our nation’s solvency while
extending twenty-first century medicine’s benefits equitably to
all will turn on our ability to seize the opportunities this
collision engenders.

